Investment treaty arbitration (ITA) 
This Article presents a case study that problematizes the prevailing conception of gradual international legal personality in ITA and in international law more generally. To this end, the Article uses ITA practice involving state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as descriptive and analytical lenses to investigate dynamics and ramifications of international legal personality. Methodically, the Article operates on two levels. First, it provides a doctrinal account on the general framework of investment law in an SOE-context and identifies the law of state responsibility and doctrines of attribution as crucial gatekeepers of international legal personality. Against this backdrop, the Article embeds legal techniques used by ITA tribunals in the wider theoretical debate over legal personality as developed in the Introduction to this Special Issue. In doing so, the Article frames the discussion in the light of Roberto Esposito's contemporary political philosophy, particularly the person/thing distinction, which is used as a stepping stone to discuss politics, porosity, and ramifications of personhood as they emerge from legal doctrines when deciding cases that involve SOE. As an undergirding argument, the Article maintains that the treatment of SOEs in ITA reproduces strict binary structures of international legal personality and non-personality, and that upholding these categories yields outcomes of exclusion and domination that are particularly visible in the North/South relations.
SOEs provide promising ground for investigating dynamics and consequences of international legal personality for conceptual, doctrinal, historical, and theoretical reasons. First, SOEs epitomize how corporations lead double lives as independent legal persons and proxies of governmental policy under state control. Occasionally, these tensions lead SOEs to assume sovereign qualities and effectively merge with their owner-the state. 9 Second, as the high number of SOE-related investment disputes suggests, delineation between states and SOEs carries significant economic consequences both for host states and foreign investors. For this reason, argumentative and doctrinal practices used to mark boundaries of the state are highly developed and well-rehearsed, allowing in-depth examination of the creation and maintenance of international legal personality on the transnational plane. 10 Third, SOEs sit comfortably on the complex historical trajectory of personhood. They straddle the ancient imperium/dominium and the more recent public/private distinction, they enmesh with the emergence of aggregate corporate personality and they reveal 8 Selkälä & Rajavuori, supra note 3. 9 As such, SOEs complicate the common taxonomy where companies are treated simultaneously as things whose stock is owned by their shareholders and as persons capable of owning property and representing themselves in legal proceedings. See dispositif of the person. 23 The role of the dispositif, in short, is to divide beings into two categories made up of different qualities and to "create subjectivity through a process of subjection or objectivization." 24 Best exemplified by treatment of slaves in Roman law, where a living human being was, in general, situated in the category of res, the dispositif emerges as a continuous performative process where persons are separated from things. 25 The example of the Roman slave highlights how abstract conceptual differentiation between persons and things has potential to lead to concrete procedures of exclusion and domination. 26 Here, Esposito notes that the constitutive power of the dispositif "lies not so much in the normative demarcation it carves out between the different categories as in the zones of indistinguishability it creates at their boundaries." 27 Thus, Esposito suggests that the dispositif exposes the porosity of personality and the ease with which a person can slip into a thing, and vice versa. 28 Moreover, the dispositif illustrates how personhood essentially feeds on "thinghood": " [T] o experience personhood fully means to keep, or push, other living individuals to the edge of thingness." 29 While illustrative, the condition of a slave is only the most visible tip of an "entire mechanism of social discipline, which works specifically by continuously shifting the categorial thresholds that define, or create, the status of all living beings" along the person/thing distinction. 30 A key theme running through his philosophy, then, attempts to tease out view of a third-whether a third person, 31 a body's point of view 32 or the common, 33 that resists domination and subjugation stemming from 23 Esposito, supra note 20. 24 Id. at 21. See also ESPOSITO, supra note 12 at 27. 25 ESPOSITO, supra note 14 at 9. Similar distinctions appear also in the context of children (filii in potestate) and married women (uxores in matrimonio). See Esposito, supra note 20 at 23-24. 26 ESPOSITO, supra note 14 at 9. 27 Id. at 9. 28 ESPOSITO, supra note 12 at 26. 29 ESPOSITO, supra note 14 at 10. 30 Id. at 9. 31 ESPOSITO, supra note 14.
32 ESPOSITO, supra note 12.
33 ROBERTO ESPOSITO, COMMUNITAS. THE ORIGIN AND DESTINY OF COMMUNITY (2010).
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Legal Persons in Investment Treaty Arbitration 1189 the person/thing distinction which runs a risk of contaminating person with qualities of things and vice versa.
34

II. Esposito Embedded
Evidently, Esposito's work is extremely anthropocentric. Operating in biopolitical tradition, he is primarily interested in human life. 35 Regardless of Esposito's affinity with the person/thing distinction as it applies to human subjects, flesh and blood, neither economic institutions in general nor state ownership in particular, is alien to his political philosophy. Writing on property, for instance, he frames globalization and ownership as woven together with major implications for human life:
For a long period of time, yet to end, the concept of government property, as public property of the state, was not the opposite of private property but a complementary aspect of it. With what we usually define as globalization, this kind of "making public"
[publicizzazione] of the private is increasingly intertwined with the inverse phenomenon of the privatization of the public in a manner that seems to exhaust, and even exclude something like a common good from the horizon of possibilities.
36
Equally critical of original enclosure movement, where resources were appropriated by the public, and current privatization movement, Esposito advocates that the best route to wholesome community starts by "breaking the vise grip between public and private that threatens to crush the common, by seeking instead to expand the space of the common."
37
As such, the issues with both private and public ownership are cast in terms of seeking and strengthening the common, the third, which is often masked and dominated by the pervasive person/thing distinction.
These two concepts, the third and the person/thing distinction, make Esposito's language relevant for investigating the dynamics of legal personhood in SOE-related ITA proceedings. 34 Selkälä & Rajavuori, supra note 3; ESPOSITO, supra note 12 at 26, 33. 35 See e.g., Timothy Campbell, "Enough of a Self": Esposito' 36 Esposito & Hanafi, supra note 21 at 89. 1 1 9 0 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 05
As suggested in the Introduction to this Special Issue, one way to go past the myriad traditions, myths, and utopias of personhood is to reinstate the body at center of the discourse. Esposito's work provides a handy shortcut to this discussion. While his approach focuses on the material human body, SOEs can also be understood as corporate bodies constituting the third. 38 Other scholars interested in Esposito's framings have already embarked on similar paths, arguing that the notions of the person/thing distinction and the dispositif are instructive as to the creation and maintenance of legal persons in general. Barkan, for instance, has shown how Esposito's broad political philosophy can be applied to corporate bodies. 39 Soirila, likewise, has used Esposito's notions to analyze the changing international legal personality of states. 40 Thus, when removed from their anthropocentric origins, Esposito philosophy seems to provide an opening through which the dynamics of legal personality, its consequences in the real world and its theoretical permutations can be gleaned.
In the following, contemporary ITA proceedings are used as a case study highlighting politics, porosity, and ramifications of personhood. 41 Through juxtaposition of the modern ITA practice and Esposito's notions of the person/thing distinction, legal framework of investment law and international law doctrines used in ITA appear as sites where SOEs form a liminal category-a third-that provides a new perspective on the constitution of international legal persons in ITA. In particular, SOEs reveal the malleability of positive international law when they, as hybrid entities and, by proxy, their owner states, are made as international legal persons in ITA. At all times, however, the (neo)liberal framework of investment law operates very close to the classic Roman dispositif of the person whose ultimate product is the slave, another hybrid entity created, used and abused by the person/thing distinction. 42 Seen from this perspective, the ITA cases discussed below seem to open a distinct dispositif of a SOE as an instrument which both delineates the exact normative demarcation of the state as international legal person and creates pockets of indistinguishability and politics at its borders. This insight provides a new perspective on creation of international legal persons in ITA but, at the same time, it also adds a new dimension to Esposito's overarching framework resting on asymmetric relationship between persons and things. 38 41 See ESPOSITO, supra note 12 . 42 Id. at 9-10. This Section provides a brief account of the legal framework and key concepts that give shape to ITA. Focusing on international legal aspects of investment law, the Section draws on the recent Tulip v. Turkey case to introduce the system of bilateral investment treaties (BITs), the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention), 43 and the law of state responsibility. The complex array of treaty law, customary international law, and arbitral practice is used to explain the status of SOEs which, by and large, escape easy definitions and, as such, provide a primer on dynamics of international legal personality. Drawing parallels between investment law and Esposito's notions of the person/thing distinction, the section notes how ITA proceedings are contingent on well-defined categories of host states (persons) and foreign investors (things) in asymmetric system. Unlike in Esposito's account, in ITA, foreign investors continuously push SOEs to the edge of personhood for the purposes of triggering state responsibility, thereby revealing how investment law essentially prizes thinghood over personhood.
I. Building on Tulip v. Turkey
Tulip v. Turkey, an ITA case decided in 2014, concerned a dispute arising from a real estate development project in Istanbul. 44 In 2006, a Dutch company, Tulip Real Estate Investment and Development Netherlands B.V (Tulip), had been awarded a tender to complete the project by Emlak Konut Gayrimenkul Yatirim Ortakligi A.S. (Emlak), a Turkish real estate investment trust. Emlak was 39% owned by TOKI, Turkey's Housing Development Organization, a state organ responsible for Turkey's public housing.
After winning the bid, Tulip set up several local companies and entered a revenue-sharing agreement with Emlak. The development project faced serious obstacles from the start. Initially, there were disputes over stamp duties and allegations of embezzlement, but as the project developed it became obvious that the construction could not be completed in the agreed timeframe. After complex negotiations, Emlak finally terminated the contract with 1 1 9 2 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 05
Tulip in May 2010. 45 Unsatisfied with the result, Tulip commenced an ITA process against Turkey under the Netherlands-Turkey BIT. 46 Tulip argued that its claims arose, among other things, out of Turkey's unlawful expropriation of rights under contract and unfair and inequitable treatment of its investment. More specifically, Tulip asserted that Turkey, "acting through various alleged state actors and/or entities operating under State control," engaged in a pattern of conduct that interfered with the development project and ultimately led to its termination. 47 As such, the claims focused on the role and conduct of Emlak and its majority shareholder TOKI. As an example of the argumentation, Tulip contended that the decision to terminate the contract "was made by Emlak under the control of TOKI for non-commercial purposes and in the exercise of State power." 48 Simply put, the claimant submitted that Emlak operated under the "presumption of statehood" and that its actions were in fact Turkey's actions. 49 Ultimately, the arbitral tribunal rejected all claims pursued by Tulip. 50 In the process, however, the award and the separate decision on annulment 51 underscored two important dimensions of contemporary investment law that illuminate dynamics of international legal personality in ITA. These dimensions relate to the tribunal's jurisdiction under the Netherlands-Turkey BIT and the ICSID Convention, as well as to the law of state responsibility. 52 Crucially, these two streams of analysis pertain to the overarching argument 45 Id. at 152-54. 46 AGREEMENT ON 57 These three sets of instruments fixed the general framework for the dispute and marked the outer bounds of the tribunal's competence. 58 Quite naturally, the single most important piece in the legal framework of Tulip v. Turkey was the Netherlands-Turkey BIT. Like most bilateral and multilateral investment treaties, the Netherlands-Turkey BIT is a state-to-state treaty which sets out terms and conditions for investment in one state by private companies and individuals of another state. Like other BITs, the Netherlands-Turkey BIT upholds a deeply asymmetric relationship between host states and foreign investors. Most importantly, the system grants investors many guarantees, such as fair and equitable treatment; full protection and security to the foreign investment; national treatment; most-favored nation treatment; and protection from investment expropriation except for a public purpose and against prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. 59 Premised on the idea that additional treaty protections will incentivize foreign direct investment (FDI) and improve economic growth and development, 60 BITs attempt to strike a balance between "the exercise of the sovereign rights of the State" and reasonable expectations of the foreign investors.
61
The Netherlands-Turkey BIT is also instructive regarding the resolution of disputes arising from potential violations of investment guarantees. Conforming to a distinctive feature of BITs, the Netherlands-Turkey BIT enables foreign investors to submit the dispute to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) for settlement by arbitration. 62 To be more precise, in the Netherlands-Turkey BIT, both state parties consent to the submission of an investment dispute to the ICSID reciprocally and a priori.
63 While 57 Id. at 58. 58 Due to this Article's scope and aim, the following discussion will focus solely on the international law dimension. 
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there are other ways for states to consent to ITA, such as a specific contractual clause or domestic legislation, in the majority of cases state consent is based on a general offer found in BITs or multilateral investment treaties. 64 Through BITs' dispute resolution clauses, states are understood to make a standing offer to arbitrate with foreign investors according to the substantive and procedural terms contained in the investment treaty. 65 Through these provisions, the Netherlands-Turkey BIT illustrates key traits of the modern investment law framework, which consists of a complex web of bilateral investment treaties, multilateral investment treaties, and free trade agreements with investment chapters amounting to 3,400 individual treaties. 66 In particular, the Netherlands-Turkey BIT underscores how states have purposely exercised their sovereign prerogative to enter investment treaties with other states and, by doing so, purposely assigned foreign investors' additional substantive protections regarding their investments. 67 Moreover, states have provided foreign investors access to ITA through individualized claims-a distinctive, and highly polarized, feature of the BIT system. 68 Regardless of the extensive substantive and procedural protections allotted to foreign investors, the treaty-based structure of the investment system remains firmly embedded in a classic international law framework where states are still considered masters of the treaty universe. States can, for example, change the rules of investment law either by amending BITs or by exiting the regime altogether.
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necessary to confer a highly-specific set of rights. 71 Thus, while states have attempted to reduce the gap between asymmetric participants through treaty regimes that protect foreign investors, from a systemic point of view investment law appears to adhere to classic binary structure of subject and objects-persons and things. In this way, the contemporary investment law system shares the most important characteristics with Esposito's tracing of asymmetric power relations encoded in the concept of legal personality.
72
As with any legal system, however, there are shades of grey when distinguishing between subjects and objects, persons and things. For Esposito, the slave as both persona and res was a clear example of a hybrid entity straddling the person/thing distinction, often to its own detriment. In the investment law context, a similar category is that of a SOE. 73 As stateowned companies established as separate legal persons in their domestic jurisdictions, 74 SOEs are nevertheless often entrusted with carrying governmental policies, particularly in sensitive fields such as energy, telecommunications, infrastructure, and finance. 75 Even when SOEs operate clearly outside any governmental prerogative, states usually retain a high degree of influence and control over companies in shareholder capacities. 76 Moreover, in typical investment projects foreign investors often contract, interact, and co-operate with SOEs, ministries, municipalities, and other sub-state entities, rather than the state itself.
77
This allows flexibility and other advantages of the corporate form, such as segmentation and limitation of potential liabilities. 78 If, however, the investment project faces obstacles, such 71 Braun, supra note 6 at 106-08. 72 See ESPOSITO, supra note 12 at 10. See also ESPOSITO, supra note 14 at 17. as governmental interference, undercapitalization, or contractual breaches, 79 questions often emerge as to the responsibility and liability of the shareholder-state. 80 Despite these issues, most investment treaties, including the Netherlands-Turkey BIT, remain silent on SOEs. 81 As a consequence, ITA tribunals have wide discretion when analyzing the status of a SOE against the substantive provision guaranteed in BITs. Because SOE-dominated sectors are often highly relevant for foreign investors, conduct of SOEs has spurred a substantial body of ITA case law where the relationship between SOEs and their owner-governments comes into focus. Because positive treaty law contained in BITs contributes only a little to the definition of SOE, other bodies of law are instrumental in mapping their status as persons or things, and the consequences that flow from such a characterization.
III. The ICSID Convention
A key piece in this process, and in the investment law framework generally, is the ICSID Convention. A procedural facility, the ICSID was intended to provide a depoliticized forum for investment disputes between host states and foreign investors. 82 Since its inception, most BITs have included a reference to ICSID as the principal forum for dispute resolution. This is mostly due to the ICSID's several unique features, which include direct enforceability and institutional links with the World Bank that provide an incentive for states to accept and comply with the ICSID awards. 84 The Netherlands-Turkey BIT also opts for the ICSID as its preferred dispute resolution forum. 84 See, e.g., Feit, supra note 77 at 143-44. 1 1 9 8 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 
IV. The Law of State Responsibility
The Netherlands-Turkey BIT does not contain any provisions pertaining to Emlak's or any other SOE's conduct. For this reason, SOE-related disputes recourse to the law of state responsibility, a specialized branch of customary international law, and especially the doctrine of attribution. 93 Attribution is a legal operation through which the conduct of a range of domestic law entities is treated as conduct of an international law entity, the state.
94 It refers to a process which aims to identify the conduct which may result in the state's international responsibility 95 and, as such, provides a critical element in shaping the legal personality of states. 96 As discussed in Tulip v. Turkey, in investment law context the issue often boils down to identifying and potentially attributing the conduct of government-affiliated entities, which nevertheless have their own legal personality, to the state. Similar to establishing the tribunal's jurisdiction under Article 25(1) ICISD Convention, states can only be held liable for 1 2 0 0 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 101 Despite the ARSIWA's rather informal form, Caron suggested already in 2002 that it would likely attract more influence as a collection of principles than as a formal instrument such as a treaty.
102 Later research has mostly confirmed this prediction, and ITA tribunals, in particular, have been noted to rely more on the ARSIWA than on the ICJ's jurisprudence. 106 More specifically, both parties referred to three primary rules of attribution contained in ARSIWA. Accordingly, the Tulip v. Turkey award reflects and illustrates the basic structure of each rule expressed in Articles 4, 5, and 8 ARSIWA, in the ILC's commentary and, to a lesser degree, in the ICJ's jurisprudence. 107 According to Article 4 ARSIWA, "the conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law," where "an organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the State." 108 The commentary further notes, invoking the classic imperium/dominium distinction, that under Article 4, "it is irrelevant for the purposes of attribution that the conduct of a State organ may be classified as 'commercial' or as acta iure gestionis."
109 Under this rule of attribution, breaches arising from contract or other markedly private arrangements can trigger state responsibility if a SOE or other sub-state entity is considered an organ of the state.
In Tulip v. Turkey, the claimant used Article 4 ARSIWA to argue that Emlak was "an arm of the Turkish government" which worked "to fulfil an executive function of the Turkish State." 110 Alternatively, it was argued that by being "majority-owned by TOKI, a State organ," 1 2 0 2 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 05
Emlak operated under "the presumption of statehood." 111 The tribunal disagreed. Relying on Emlak's status as a separate company operating under the Turkish Commercial Code, it was contended that Emlak did not fulfill the requirement of being an organ under the internal law of the state. Emlak was not a "'quasi-state' organ."
112 Moreover, the tribunal explicitly denied that ownership of a corporate entity by the State triggers the presumption of statehood. The position of the Tribunal is that, whilst state ownership may, in certain circumstances, be a factor relevant to the question of attribution, it does not convert a separate corporate entity into an 'organ' of the State.
113
Under the Article 5 ARSIWA, the conduct of a person or entity which is empowered by the law of the state to "exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the state under international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity in the particular instance." The commentary takes SOEs explicitly into account as it holds that "the existence of a greater or lesser State participation in [entity's] capital, or, more generally, in the ownership of its assets" are not decisive criteria for attributing conduct.
114
Following the rationale of Article 5, Tulip argued that Emlak was empowered to exercise "power under Turkey's zoning laws and with respect to land acquisition from TOKI's land banks" 115 
Legal Persons in Investment Treaty Arbitration 1203
with Tulip showed no signs of exercising governmental authority in particular instances, such as its termination of the revenue-sharing contract.
118
The most detailed probe into the relationship between Emlak and the state was conducted under Article 8 ARSIWA, which holds that the conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a state under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that state in carrying out the conduct. Here, the commentary notes very directly that "corporate entities, although owned by and in that sense subject to the control of the State, are considered to be separate, prima facie their conduct in carrying out their activities is not attributable."
119
When there "was evidence that the corporation was exercising public powers, or that the State was using its ownership interest in or control of a corporation specifically in order to achieve a particular result," however, attribution is possible.
120
Under the framework of Article 8 ARSIWA, Tulip argued that "TOKI exercised 'an extraordinary level of control over every aspect of Emlak's operations,'" chiefly though controlling voting and appointing directors to Emlak's board. 121 Moreover, the claimant contended that the specific decision to "terminate the Contract was made by Emlak under the control of TOKI for non-commercial purposes and in the exercise of State power."
122 The tribunal rejected, by majority, Tulip's claims. 123 Considering all relevant elements of under Article 8-instructions, direction, and control-the tribunal accepted that "from an ordinary company law perspective, Emlak was subject to the control of TOKI and, therefore, the Turkish State." 124 Nevertheless, there was no indication as to Emlak being directed by TOKI "with respect to the specific activity of administering the Contract with Tulip JV in the sense of sovereign direction instruction or control rather than the ordinary control exercised by a majority shareholder acting in the company's perceived commercial best interests." 125 In the view of the tribunal, there was no "improper usurpation of the Claimant's rights by the 1 2 0 4 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 05
'invisible' hand of the State." 126 Rather, Emlak acted "in what it perceived to be its commercial best interest in terminating the Contract."
127 Thus, even though one arbitrator argued that Emlak's decision to terminate the contract was "guided-if not fully directedby the sovereign's hand,"
128 the majority held that its decisions were based on viable commercial grounds. Moreover, the tribunal noted that even if Emlak's actions were attributable, they would not amount to violation of the Netherlands-Turkey BIT.
129
In sum, the deliberation in Tulip v. Turkey seems to affirm the "fundamental precept in international law that attribution should not follow state ownership because of separate legal personality." 130 Thus, in order to construe SOEs as entities capable of triggering state responsibility in ITA, claimants have to show-with reference to their statutory position, governmental authority, or control-that they were, in fact, filled with sovereign spirit. 131 To gain compensation, SOEs need to be made persons and not things. This idea provides the rationale and drive behind much of SOE-related ITA proceedings, but it also connects the highly-specialized doctrines of investment law to Esposito's notion of the person/things distinction and opens a distinct dispositif of a SOE.
V. Lessons of Tulip v. Turkey: Of SOEs and Slaves
Tulip v. Turkey provides a handy illustration of legal and political dimensions of modern investment law and ITA. In terms of law, the case highlights interdependence between BITs' substantive protections, the ICSID Convention's jurisdictional provisions, and the law of state responsibility. Politically, the case sheds light on the polarized environment of FDI where the possibility to commence individualized claims against a host state is a staple in a foreign 126 Id. at 321. 127 Id. at 324. In Tulip v. Turkey, the tribunal rejected all claims arising from the contractual dispute between the claimant and Emlak, a state-owned entity. Throughout the proceedings, the status of Emlak was under spotlight. Was it a state organ? Did it exercise governmental authority? Did Turkey control Emlak and use its ownership to specifically terminate to contract? While not confined to ITA, 133 Tulip v. Turkey demonstrates how well-rehearsed these argumentative patterns are. As a general rule, foreign investors tend to argue that the host state is responsible for a breach traceable to a SOE. At the same time, respondent states will point to the separate legal personality of the SOE, underscore its independent decisionmaking, and emphasize inherent counterparty risks present in any investment decision. 134 Thus, in Tulip v. Turkey, the claimant based its argument on Emlak's presumed statehood, and the respondent on its corporatehood-or, in Esposito's terms, its status as a person or a thing. While technical, these arguments illuminate the stakes in construing proper parties to arbitral proceedings. Further, they provide a clear window to the dynamics of making or breaking international legal persons.
Ultimately, the factual circumstances in Tulip v. Turkey were such that state responsibility over the conduct of Emlak was not triggered and the dispute was viewed to fall outside the tribunal's jurisdiction. Thus, in Tulip v. Turkey, attribution emerged as crucial doctrinal platform where the conduct of Emlak was rendered illegible in the eyes of investment law: Because the separate personality of Emlak was upheld, there was no case to be made against the host state. 135 In many other cases, however, the outcome has been different. Apposite 1 2 0 6 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 05
ITA awards range from energy development 136 to disputes arising from duty-free shops, 137 cocoa bean processing, 138 hotel development, 139 waste management, 140 and financial hedging agreements. 141 Moreover, many high-profile disputes have stemmed from failed privatizations 142 and large-scale nationalizations. 143 Appropriately, even the single largest ITA award to date, Yukos v. Russia, contains an important attribution-dimension in SOE context. 144 In these cases, and many others, 145 the exact bounds and definitions of the host state greatly affect the outcome of proceedings. If the respondent is construed in a way that excludes SOEs and other sub-state entities, claimants often face an uphill battle. If, on the other hand, the respondent is construed expansively to include its instrumentalities, the claimant has more avenues to pursue compensation over alleged infringements of substantive investment treaty provisions. 146 While distributional impacts of such exclusionary/inclusionary dynamics are obvious, 147 for the purposes of this Article it is more important to note the impact of attribution doctrines on creation and maintenance of international legal personality in ITA. Viewed against Esposito's person/thing distinction, the basic framework of investment law-BITs, the ICSID Convention, the law of state responsibility-emerges as a stable legal environment where the roles of host states as persons and foreign investors as things are well-defined. In this framework, sovereign persons make and maintain investment law while foreign investor things use the system's substantive and procedural protections as a spring board to accelerate both their own and the host states' economic development through increased FDI. Contrary to Esposito's account of the Roman Institutes, however, the legal environment of investment law essentially privileges thinghood. On one hand, only private foreign investors have access to BITs' protective embrace. 148 On the other hand, the system incentivizes them to define host states as expansively as possible. 149 While making exclusionary/inclusionary host states parties to the dispute takes place in a system states have themselves created, the dynamics of ITA leave it to foreign investors to construe applicable definitions of the host state through creative litigation. The asymmetric structure of investment law is calibrated so that things make persons for the purposes of establishing jurisdiction and, ultimately, triggering state responsibility and liability.
In sum, the condition of a SOE highlights the exclusive nature of international personality in ITA. Unlike many theories on gradual personality suggest, 150 SOEs assume the role of either a person or that of a thing in ITA and, due to the dearth of primary treaty law concerning sub-state entities, the role of attribution doctrines is crucial in making the distinction. Much like slaves in ancient Rome, SOEs straddle the two conceptual categories and constantly risk being cast either as functional part of the state (person) or separate legal persons (thing). Amidst these doctrinally-entrenched positions, the treatment of SOEs acts within a continuous performative process, the dispositif, where persons are separated from things. 
D. Politics, Porosity, and Ramifications of International Legal Personality in ITA
The previous section sketched the basic legal framework of investment law which rests on stable asymmetric relationships between host states (persons) and foreign investors (things). The law of state responsibility was further identified as a key site for making context-sensitive distinctions between state and non-state in an otherwise strictly binary system. In the case of Emlak and other SOEs, ITA tribunals cast state-owned companies as persons or things per the logic of attribution doctrine codified in the ARSIWA. Against this backdrop, this section follows Esposito's idea of indistinguishability and uses dispositif of a SOE to highlight politics, porosity, and ramifications of international legal personality in ITA. Two arguments, largely based on the North/South relations, are pursued. In the bottom-up approach, irregularities in ITA tribunals' application of attribution doctrines are used to illustrate conflicts in defining the limits of international legal personality. In the top-down approach, dynamics of international legal personality are juxtaposed with the concept of quasi-sovereignty developed in postcolonial theory. Together, these micro-and macro-level arguments suggest SOEs emerge as a liminal category straddling the person/thing distinction-a process which enables the use and abuse of SOEs as instruments of exclusion and domination with severe implications in the real-world. To illustrate the relevance of this discussion, the section starts by reviewing three cases that highlight variations when ITA tribunals make or break international legal persons.
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I. Personal Anxieties: The Case of Petrobangla
While multilayered and complex, the framework of investment law is generally viewed as stable. Accordingly, the system is also expected to lead to broadly consistent and foreseeable outcomes in individual cases. Naturally, however, the reality is more complicated. 154 Consider the case of Bangladesh Oil Gas and Mineral Corporation Petrobangla (Petrobangla). Over the past decade, Bangladesh has been drawn into three ITA proceedings that emanate from Petrobangla's actions vis-a-vis its contractual counterparts. While the cases have stemmed from unique contractual schemes and have been arbitrated under different BITs, it is important to note how each tribunal has viewed the position of Petrobangla differently.
In Saipem v. Bangladesh, the tribunal accepted that "at first sight at least, Petrobangla appears to be part of the State under Bangladeshi law" at the jurisdictional stage. 155 On the merits, however, Petrobangla's conduct was likened to a rational market participant acting in its commercial self-interest, leading the tribunal to find no treaty breach with respect to Petrobangla and its conduct non-attributable to Bangladesh. 156 By contrast, in Chevron Bangladesh Blocks Thirteen and Fourteen v. Bangladesh, the tribunal launched an extensive investigation into Petrobangla's status at the jurisdictional stage, ruling that Petrobangla was a public statutory body and, as such, an organ of the state under the Article 4 ARSIWA. 157 Thus, all Petrobangla's actions were "attributable to Bangladesh."
158
At the merits, Petrobangla was also considered to fall under the requirements set in Articles 5 and 8 ARSIWA due to its statutory creation, operation in a highly-regulated field, supervision, and funding. 159 Finally, in Niko Resources v. Bangladesh, Bapex and Petrobangla, the tribunal found that Petrobangla, regardless of its statutory origin and exclusive competencies, remained an 1 2 1 0 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 05 entity separate from the state. 160 Thus, the tribunal concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Bangladesh.
161 Based on a special rule in the Article 25(1) ICSID Convention, however, the tribunal viewed Bangladesh to have "designated, implicitly but necessarily . . . Petrobangla as [an] agenc [y] ." 162 The decision was informed by the status of Petrobangla as a proxy of Bangladesh's mineral policy and by the government's involvement in contract negotiations.
163 Accordingly, Petrobangla was properly conferred "limited international capacity," 164 making it, and not the owner-state, bound by the arbitration clauses.
165
Unique legal frameworks-whether BIT, domestic law, or contract-and factual circumstances aside, in each case ITA tribunals provided a different ruling on the relationship between Bangladesh and Petrobangla. In Saipem, Petrobangla was not deemed a functional part of the state. In Chevron, it was. In Niko, an intermediate position based on a special rule in the ICSID Convention was used to keep the state and the company in separate containers but, at the same, the close relationship between the two bound the company in arbitral proceedings as an implicitly designated entity. Thus, each tribunal used a variation of the dispositif of a SOE to construe the respondent state differently-although one should note that each case resulted in compensation to the foreign investor. In the following, Petrobangla's personal anxieties are gleaned through two perspectives-the doctrinal ambiguity of attribution and postcolonial theory-that highlight politics, porosity, and the ramifications of international legal personality, particularly in the North/South relations.
II. Bottom-up Approach: Instabilities and Politics of Attribution Doctrines
Three renditions of Petrobangla by different ITA tribunals illustrate the variations that ensue when the law of state responsibility and attribution doctrines are applied to concrete cases. In the first instance, however, they draw attention to wider ramifications of making 161 Id. at 256. 162 Id. at 345. For discussion on distinguishing "designation" from "attribution," see SCHREUER ET AL., supra note 64, at 150-51. The significance of attribution doctrines to the form and function of a sovereign state is particularly pertinent in North/South relations. As was the case with Petrobangla, the vast majority of all ITA proceedings involve investors from developed countries litigating against developing country governments. 167 Moreover, most SOE cases referenced in this Article have been lodged against countries such as Bangladesh, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, Oman, Sri Lanka, and Venezuela, as well as European transition economies like Poland, Romania, Ukraine, and Russia. 168 In these circumstances, the system-level ramifications of attribution doctrines are easily drawn to the fore. Crawford and Mertenskötter make this point clear when they argue that "[e]specially in an international context where BIT claims are still, albeit decreasingly, dominated by companies representing affluent investors against States with low GDPs per capita, the distributive effects of extending attribution rules in the context of international investment law may be significant." 169 While the role of attribution doctrines sustaining the global distributional asymmetry is acknowledged, their political dimension is usually toned down by referring to the law of state responsibility as an inter-state bargain, an agreement between equal international persons. According to one notable commentator, for instance, "[a]dmittedly, the rules [of 1 2 1 2 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. In reality, however, both the scope and content of attribution doctrines under the ARSIWA are more malleable. To some extent, discrepancies between different ITA awards are expected because the ARSIWA is still a relatively young instrument. 174 In this regard, Hobér has pinpointed attribution doctrines as the chief culprits
[i]n the new era of investment arbitration there is one particular aspect of the law of state responsibility which has become increasingly important, namely, the attribution of conduct to states. The rules and principles pertaining to the attribution of conduct to states have come to play an important role, partly because states and their representatives often seem to be unaware of 170 187 Badia has viewed especially the "test of the ILC Article 8 . . . a hard nut to crack" and criticized several ITA tribunals for using "unconvincing" and "entirely naïf" interpretative standards when applying attribution doctrines to SOEs. 188 Olleson, in turn, has ascribed misapplication of the law of the state responsibility on the fact that "the rules of attribution . . . are well known and are easily accessible [and] there is a risk that they may be inappropriately applied to issues to which, on analysis, they are of no relevance." 189 Clearly, all critical positions juxtapose the ARSIWA's intended conceptual framework and the way they are applied by ITA tribunals. Nevertheless, when critics draw attention to expansive and doctrinally misconstrued use of the ARSIWA's rules of attribution in an SOE-context, 183 Crawford, supra note 181, at 128. 191 Commenting on dynamics between the tribunals, Olleson considers the approach pursued by the Niko tribunal correct as it rightly interprets the Chevron ruling as misusing the attribution doctrine "in determining the question of whether the State had consented to arbitrate" at the jurisdictional stage.
192
As technical as they are, these doctrinal arguments undergird the construction of proper parties to arbitral proceedings and, by proxy, states as international legal persons.
193
While the three recent cases against Bangladesh stem from unique legal and factual circumstances, irregularities in applying the law of state responsibility expose more general tensions when used to define the exact limits of the state either as a party to the ITA proceedings or for liability purposes. In concrete cases, particularly those that focus on political economies very different from stable Western liberal democracies, attribution doctrines may lead to overly exclusionary or inclusionary conceptions of the state, or rulings where attributability of a SOEs conduct is essentially predetermined at the jurisdictional stage. In both instances, seemingly neutral application of seemingly consistent law of state responsibility exposes the fault lines and stakes when ad hoc arbitrators make or break international legal persons. Belonging on a longer continuum of criticism over instable application of attribution, the treatment of Petrobangla illustrates how different ITA tribunals, applying the same analytical and interpretative tools arising from the ARSIWA, can readily cast the same SOE both as a functional part of the host state (person) and as an independent company (thing).
Instead of coming across as a stable codification of customary international law, the rules contained in the ARSIWA emerge rife with ambiguities and political tensions that illuminate pockets of indistinguishability around the boundaries of a SOE. As such, attribution doctrines as applied to SOEs-much like slaves in ancient Rome-exemplify the ease with which SOEs oscillate between the categories of persons and things, and also underscore the concrete 1 2 1 6 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 05 modes of exclusion and domination the person/thing distinction produces. 194 Thus, when applied to SOEs, the process of casting state-affiliated entities as persons or things per the ARSIWA's logical rules appears less convincing than what the basic framework of investment law seems to suggest.
Moreover, Petrobangla's personal anxieties resonate with broader contemporary theorization of legal personality. Writing in the context of machine rights, Calverley, for instance, notes how exercise of "positive law, expressed in making, defining, and formalizing" different institutions and categories operates primarily "through the manipulation of the definition of the legal concept of person." 195 In the case of SOEs, the plasticity of customary international law rules of attribution along the person/thing distinction certainly evoke similar pattern. 196 Against this backdrop, the fluidity of the ARSIWA's scope and content in SOE-related disputes resonates with long-standing criticism of the ITA system. 197 In this regard, van Harten, for instance, does not consider the fact that the process where arbitrators define the reach of the state "in the foggy borderland between the worlds of public and private" particularly surprising. 198 Just as domestic and supra-national courts have rendered countless rulings defining exact limits of state for the purposes of liability, ITA tribunals, on occasion, need to delineate between government and corporation to decide a case. Considering the perceived rift in arbitrators' epistemic communities, where one side of arbitrators emphasize ITA as commercial dispute settlement and the other as essentially public adjudication, 202 the variance in applying attribution doctrines appears essentially as a process where arbitrators' "emotive associations" are brought to the foreground. 203 Here, it has been suggested that "arbitration involves the creation of subjectivities which come to exert a controlling effect on the imagination of its practitioners," thus projecting a particular political vision of the proper balance between state/non-state and public/private onto ITA proceedings. 204 As the malleability of attribution doctrines suggest, the dispositif of a SOE may provide a view to an even longer historical continuum structured around the person/thing distinction that continues to sustain the use and abuse of legal personhood and subjectivity in ITA. 205 
III. Top-down Approach: Postcolonial Theory and Bound Personality
In addition to such a doctrine-bound bottom-up approach that illuminates ramifications of international legal personality, the growth of ITA has spawned intensive debate on the impact of the concept of sovereignty on international legal personality. 206 Dynamics between these concepts are closely intertwined, and their link to state responsibility is clearly acknowledged. In this regard, Koskenniemi, for instance, contends that "'State responsibility' is a necessary aspect of international law's being 'law', perhaps an indispensable element of the legal personality of States." 207 Similarly, Pellet describes the dynamics of sovereignty, responsibility, and personality in the following way: 1 2 1 8 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 05
[r]esponsibility interacts with the notion of sovereignty, and affects its definition, while, reciprocally, the omnipresence of sovereignty in international relations inevitably influences the conception of international responsibility . . . . [Further,] the very notion of responsibility has been drastically modified . . . it is no longer reserved only for States, and has become an attribution of the international legal personality of other subjects of international law.
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While there are multiple ways to conceptualize macro-level interrelatedness of these concepts, the following opts for the lens of the Third World approaches to international law (TWAIL). The use of such a macro lens flows naturally from the development of new modes of legal personhood under the 21 st century globalization as very different political economies have converged. Much of this process owes to the success of international economic law regimes, investment law included, that have expanded certain forms of state and corporate personhood to cover the entire globe. 209 As such, the TWAIL framing of SOEs along the person/thing distinction serves a litmus test indicating the ways international legal personality of (mostly developing) states is construed, and thus complements the above discussion on concentration of SOE proceedings against developing states whose statecompany-relationship differs from the standards of (Western) liberal law.
210
Part of a larger trajectory of postcolonial theory, 211 TWAIL is a research tradition that investigates creation, maintenance, and renewal of imbalances between developed and Third World societies through international law. 212 Within international economic law, for instance, TWAIL approach is used to expose entrenched and uneven structures in legal regimes that manage tensions of international commerce for the benefit of the Global North. 213 In the specific context of investment law, Sornarajah has argued that "the sovereign Third World states represent a caricature of "the principle of exteriority (as opposed to the principle of inclusion)." 229 Parallels with Esposito's framing are obvious. A product of the person/thing distinction, quasi-sovereignty appears as a mechanism where Third World society is briefly pushed to the edge of personhood with the sole intent of discipline. 230 Crucially, these techniques also surface in international arbitration. Analyzing oil disputes arising from decolonization-era nationalizations in the 1960s and 1970s, Anghie uncovers a broadly similar dynamic where "Third World sovereignty [was] . . . rendered uniquely vulnerable and dependent by international law." 231 In these arbitrations, oil concession contracts between Third World states and Western multinational companies were identified as quasi-treaties that granted companies extensive protections against expropriation. The key takeaway from such quasi-treaties was how a "Third World state, by contracting with the corporation, was providing it with a quasi-sovereign status-which gave it significant powers, not least of which was an elevation of its status to the international plane." 232 As such, early oil arbitrations displayed a curious double movement where "on one hand, the Third World state elevated the corporation to the international level, and the concession was a quasi-treaty. On the other, the state, by entering into these concessions, is taken to have acted almost as a strictly private party, dealing with equals." 233 Thus, the Third World state was understood to turn a private company, at that time clearly an object (thing) of international law, into a quasi-subject (person) of that system through an internationalized contract. 234 Participation in arbitral proceedings against a sovereign state was possible only because international legal personality of the company was construed in a particular way. Analyzing the same case law as Anghie, Shalakany, too, notes how the Texaco awards, 235 in particular, exposed the dynamics of Third World sovereign personality. In Shalakany's view, public/private distinction was the key in understanding the process: 1 2 2 4 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 05
In sum, micro-level analysis discussed in the previous section suggested that the application of attribution doctrines by the ITA tribunals stem from the need to give shape to a host state as an international legal person. As evidenced by SOE-related ITA proceedings, when deciding a concrete case, questions of state responsibility and liability are often contingent on the exclusionary or inclusionary definition of the state. In many critical narratives, creation and maintenance of such international legal persons is understood to take place in a fundamentally skewed framework which, allegedly, grants significant rights to foreign investors (things) vis-à-vis host states (persons) and, simultaneously, limits the governments' ability to regulate their domestic societies in ways that might impair foreign investment.
247 Similarly, the macro-level analysis of TWAIL suggests that the concepts of sovereignty and international legal personality are inexplicably connected, and that this link continues to render Third World sovereignty as vulnerable and dependent also in ITA. 248 Contrary to postcolonial theorization on quasi-sovereignty, however, modern ITA does not cast SOEs in roles characterized by property, legal incapacity, and non-personality. 249 Instead, SOEs display inversed vulnerability where TWAIL-related processes of appropriation and subjugation are buttressed by granting them international legal personality. In both cases, the dispositif of a SOE exposes the porosity of international legal personality and its consequences in the real-world, particularly for developing states and those pursuing different models of political economy.
E. Conclusion
SOEs straddle key conceptual dichotomies-such as government/market and public/private-that continue to shape investment law as a species of (neo)liberal law. This Article has investigated treatment of SOEs in ITA as an upshot of yet another dichotomy: The person/thing distinction. Using Roberto Esposito's terminology, I have suggested that through the dispositif of a SOE we gain a new perspective to assess and understand politics, porosity, and ramifications of international legal personality and open the highly-specialized area of investment law to broader trajectories of political and social theory. Due to the centrality of investment law in contemporary global economic architecture, these changes impinge on fundamental concepts of legal personhood that give shape to international relations and international law more broadly. 1 2 2 8 G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Vol. 18 No. 05
